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Recent Developments

Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valentin

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland
held
that
punItIve damages were not
recoverable in a defamation action
where the plaintiff could not prove
that the defendant acted with
actual knowledge that a particular
defamatory statement was false.
Le Marc's Management Corp. v.
Valentin, 359 Md. 645, 709 A.2d
1222 (1998). In prior defamation
actions, the court generally
allowed punitive damages based
on defamatory statements made
with actual malice or conscious,
deliberate, or reckless disregard for
the truth. The court modeled the
new standard for punitive damages
in defamation cases after the
standard applied in other tort
actions.
In late 1987, Francisco
Valentin ("Valentin") moved from
Puerto Rico to New York City and
became employed as a stock room
clerk at Le Marc's Fifth Avenue
Cards, Inc. ("Le Marc's"). In May
1988, upon learning ofthefts at the
store, Le Marc's administered
polygraph tests to its Hispanic
employees, including Valentin.
Valen'..in's test was judged
inconclusive due in part to the
language barrier. However, the
examiner also reported to Robert
Sauer, Le Marc's corporate
administrator, that he believed
Valentin
was
withholding
information. Shortly thereafter,
Valentin decided to leave Le
Marc's. Valentin submitted a
letter of resignation to his manager
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and, in return, received a letter of
recommendation.
Valentin
relocated to Maryland where he
was hired as a teller-trainee for
Sovran Bank. The bank sought
references from Valentin's past
employers, including Le Marc's.
Upon receiving the bank's request,
Sauer consulted his records and
returned a reference documenting
that Valentin had been terminated
from Le Marc's due to pilferage.
The bank suspended Valentin and
gave him four days to clear his
reference from Le Marc's or he
would be terminated.
Valentin
immediately
contacted Sauer who promised to
investigate Valentin's employment
record. In a private meeting with
Valentin, Sauer agreed that the
information contained in the
reference letter was inaccurate and
that Valentin had not been
terminated
for
pilferage.
Nevertheless, the second version
of the reference the bank received

from Sauer did not clear Valentin's
name, but instead undermined his
overall credibility.
The letter
implied that Valentin had been
engaged in "covering something
up." As a result of this report, the
bank terminated Valentin for
"falsifying" his employment
application. This action rendered
him
ineligible
for
future
employment with the bank.
Valentin filed a defamation
action against Le Marc's in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. A jury awarded Valentin
$25,000 in compensatory damages
and $130,000 in punitive damages.
The trial court granted Le Marc's
motion for remittitur which
reduced the punitive damage
award to $75,000. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the compensatory damage
award but held that the punitive
damage award should have been
vacated because the jury was not
instructed as to the proper standard
of proof for punitive damages.
The case was retried on the sole
issue of punitive damages and an
award was returned for Valentin in
the amount of $700,000. Le
Marc's motions for a new trial,
judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and remittitur were all
denied by the trial court. Le
Marc's appealed and the Court of
Appeals of Maryland issued a writ
of certiorari.
In justifying the new standard
set forth in Le Marc's, the court
reviewed a series of defamation
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actions decided shortly after the
United States Supreme Court's
1964 landmark decision, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). Le Marc's, 359 Md.
at 650, 709 A.2d at 1225. In
Sullivan, the Court explained that
a public figure must first establish
"that the defendant acted with
actual
malice,
defined
as
knowledge that [the defamatory
statement] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Id. (citing New
York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254).
In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283
Md. 131,387 A.2d 1129 (1978), a
defamation action decided after
Sullivan, the Mary land common
law standard set forth allowed
pumtive damages where the
plaintiff could prove that the
defamatory statement was made
with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard for the
truth. Le Marc's, 359 Md. at 651,
709 A.2d at 1225. However,
actual malice, including ill-will,
spite, hatred or intent to injure,
was not sufficient to support such
a claim. Id. (citing Marchesi, 283
Md. 131,387 A.2d 1129).
The court then reviewed the
Maryland standard for allowing
punitive damages in tort actions
other than defamation. In OwensIllinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
601 A.2d 633 (1992), a products
liability action addressing the
recovery of pvnitive damages, the
court held that punitive damages
were appropriate where the
plaintiff could prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the
defendant's
actions
were

motivated by actual malice. Le
Marc's, 359 Md. at 651-52, 709
A.2d at 1225-26. Moreover, the
court held that the plaintiff must
prove the defendant had actual
knowledge of a particular defect
and that "armed with this actual
knowledge,
the
defendant
consciously
or
deliberately
disregarded the potential harm to
consumers." Id. at 651-52, 709
A.2d at 1226 (citing Zenobia, 325
Md. at 463,601 A.2d 633).
Following Zenobia, the court
of appeals required that with
respect to tort actions, punitive
damage awards were to be based
upon knowing and deliberate
wrongdoing where the defendant
had actual knowledge of the falsity
of a particular defamatory
statement. Id at 652, 709 A.2d at
1226. Applying the same standard
to defamation actions, the court
further clarified and refined the
decisions following Zenobia by
requiring that an award for
punitive damages be based upon
proof that a defamatory statement
was made with the requisite mens
real or actual knowledge of its
falsity. Id. at 652-53, 709 A.2d at
1226. Subsequent decisions then
limited the recovery of punitive
damages to only those situations
when the defendant had actual
knowledge that a particular
defamatory statement was false.
In the court's most recent
opinion similar to the instant case,
Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337
Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995), a
fraud and deceit action, the court
held that reckless indifference for
the truth was not the same thing as

having actual knowledge of the
falsity. Le Marc's, 359 Md. at
654, 709 A.2d at 1227.
Furthermore,
while
reckless
indifference does "encompass a
level of actual knowledge," it does
not rise to the level "sufficient to
satisfy the actual knowledge of
falsity required for pumtive
damages." Id. The Le Marc's
court concluded that the holding in
Ellerin reinforced the notion that
actual knowledge of the falsity was
the appropriate standard for
awarding punitive damages in
defamation cases. Id. As a matter
of law, reckless disregard was
rej ected as the standard for the
award of punitive damages. Id.
(citing Ellerin, 337 Md. at 235,
652 A.2d 1117).
In dissent,
Judge Bell
disagreed with the majority'S new
ruling, which altered the previous
common law standard articulated
in Marchesi. Id. at 656, 709 A.2d
at 1228. Judge Bell argued that
the decision might have the effect
to "insulate certain reprehensible
conduct from proper punishment."
/d.
Conduct in which the
defendant acts with "reckless
indifference" is no better than
similar conduct in which the
defendant acts with "actual
knowledge." Id at 658, 709 A.2d
at 1229. Furthermore, Judge Bell
suggested that the damage to the
person wronged is not less
reproachable simply because a
defendant knows that what he is
saying is false than if made
without that certainty of the truth.
Id. Lastly, Judge Bell stated that
what disturbed him most about the
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 59
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majority's decision was that "it
simply will not be important to
ensure that what is communicated
about another person is true." Id.
In Le Marc's Management
Corp. v. Valentin, the court of
appeals articulated a new standard
for punitive damage awards in
defamation actions. In order to
recover pumtIve damages, a
plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the
defamer knew that the statement
was false. Judge Bell argued that
perhaps the majority drew too fine
a distinction between actual
knowledge
and
reckless
indifference.
Nevertheless,
considering the public outrage in
recent years over the exorbitant
jury awards in tort actions, the
majority's decision to tighten the
standard by which plaintiffs can
seek monetary damage claims in
defamation actions will likely be
viewed as a positive public policy
choice. Perhaps the legislature
might seriously consider adopting
the court's new common-law
standard.
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